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I. Introduction
Does international law matter, or is it just a "fairy ship upon a
fairy sea: a beautiful construct of the legal imagination floating
upon a sea of false assumptions[?] ' 1  International legal
compliance (ILC),2 the newest and most rapidly developing
subfield in international law, was born in the early 1990s from the
revived debate between legalization theorists, a group committed
to the belief that the transformation wrought by the end of the
Cold War has rendered international law independently capable of
constraining and shaping the behavior of states, and their critics, a
group committed to the contrary notion that international law
remains primarily an aspirational enterprise subordinate to politics
and epiphenomenal to state practice.
In attempting to prevail on the question of the efficacy of
international law, legalists and skeptics alike have set about
propounding and testing an array of interrelated theories. In the
process, the questions of whether, why, and under what
circumstances states elect to comply with international law have
emerged as the most central and pressing issues within the
t Assistant Professor of Law, John S. Grimes Fellow, and Dean's Fellow, Indiana
University School of Law, Indianapolis, Indiana. LL.M., Harvard Law School, 2001;
Ph.D., Northwestern University, 1995.
1 C.G. WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALISING INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (2004).
2 The field that has organized around the question of international legal
compliance has never been so named. ILC is the original designation of the author of
this Article.
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international legal academy. Building upon the insights of
international relations theory and the methodologies of the social
sciences, the field of ILC has organized around competing answers
to these meta-questions, and the body of ILC scholarship now
consists of eight books and nearly one hundred articles.
This bibliography lists and annotates the major entries within
the ILC corpus. For each entry, a brief summary with one or more
numbers corresponding to the list of major ILC themes listed
below is provided. Although the bibliography is intended to be
complete and comprehensive, it does not list every article that can
arguably be included within the ILC corpus. Short articles
duplicative of the previous work of scholars have been omitted, as
have articles that are either tangentially connected to ILC or are
largely descriptive rather than analytical. Although the majority of
ILC scholars are legal academics, an effort has been made to
include the works of authors in related fields such as international
relations and economics.
The methodology is as follows. A search of Westlaw, Lexis,
and Worldcat was conducted to identify every potential book and
article in the field of ILC. Each source was then read to ensure it
fit within the field. Additional articles cited or discussed by the
authors of each source were noted for possible inclusion. A
preliminary draft of the bibliography was sent to each author for
comments, corrections, and suggestions for additional authors and
sources.
To be included in the bibliography, each source was required
to address one or more of the themes that constitute the field of
ILC. These themes, along with the number and letter scheme
employed to denote them, are as follows:
1. General theory. Many ILC scholars have advanced
competing theories to explain and predict patterns of compliance
and noncompliance in international relations. These various
theories, described in the annotations accompanying relevant
bibliographic entries, can be organized into the following series of
theoretical clusters: (a) realism, (b) enforcement theory, (c)
rational choice theory, (d) liberal theory, (e) managerial theory, (f)
reputational theory, (g) transnational legal process, (h) legitimacy
theory, (i) constructivism, (j) organizational-cultural theory, and
(k) personality theory.
2. Empirical analysis. ILC scholars are increasingly moving
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beyond mere descriptive work or thought experimentation and are
subjecting ILC theories to empirical analysis. Several have
applied the methodological tools of the social and natural sciences,
including multivariate statistics, rigorous comparative analysis,
and detailed case studies, to develop testable and falsifiable
general propositions regarding relationships between rules and
behaviors and to inform proposals for regime modification.
3. Skeptics. A minority of ILC scholars insist that compliance
is the exception rather than the rule and that international law is
little more than an aspirational venture. Some, without rejecting
outright the causal significance of law in regard to state behaviors,
contend that legalization inversely correlates with regimes
normative principle compliance.
4. Critical perspectives. Several scholars treat the question of
compliance as the point of entry to challenge international law as
illegitimate for failing to include or for subordinating a plethora of
subnational organizations, groups, and peoples.
5. Relationship to domestic law and institutions. A number of
scholars link compliance with international law to the structure or
function of domestic law or institutions, typically by treating
incorporation of international law within the domestic legal system
as a necessary condition precedent to compliance or by describing
domestic courts as the only effective sites for enforcement.
6. High/low politics. The assumption central to the discipline
of international law that regards international relations as
uniformly susceptible to legal regulation may well be false. Some
ILC scholars contend very directly that a hierarchy of issue-areas
orders the international legal system and that patterns of
cooperation have been far easier to generate and sustain in "low
politics" issue areas, generally understood as economic, cultural,
and social issues, than in questions of "high politics," defined
narrowly as matters of war and peace. Other scholars, without
directly asserting a high/low politics distinction, simply confine
their analyses of findings to the particular "low politics" issue-
areas under investigation and refrain from generalizing to other
issue-areas.
7. Survey. Many of the authors provide an overview,
description, and a critique of some or all of the various ILC
theories.
8. Human agency. A small group of scholars with
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
interdisciplinary backgrounds regards the state as an abstraction
without the capacity to exercise a choice between alternatives and
treats the question of compliance as one of human agency. For
human agency theorists within the ILC field, people, rather than
states, make compliance decisions, and the objective of their
scholarship is to produce an account for the micro-foundations of
personality that are causally linked to compliance.
9. Methodological and epistemological issues. Part of the
literature within the ILC field is dedicated to the operation of the
concept of compliance as a testable phenomenon, the design of
experiments to test causal relationships between legal regimes and
state behaviors, the selection and application of analytical methods
to assess compliance data, the systematic and rigorous
interpretation of research findings, the validation of data, methods,
and conclusions, and the articulation and evaluation of knowledge
claims.
10. Effectiveness. A group of empirically-minded scholars
have called into question whether "compliance" is an adequate
conceptual framework within which to evaluate whether
international legal regimes further their normative policy
objectives. Because a high level of compliance with a given
regime may simply reflect the failure to require states to undertake
anything more than modest departures from what they would have
done in the absence of an agreement, and because certain
agreements that impose significant constraints may meet with
relatively low levels of compliance without sabotaging the norms
states-parties seek to advance, the concept of "effectiveness,"
defined as the degree to which a regime is successful in
transforming state behaviors consistent with the norms that
underlie the regime, has been introduced as a substitute for
compliance.
The following annotations, of course, cannot begin to do
justice to the rich body of thought they summarize. At most, they
identify several major themes in each source. Readers are
encouraged to read the complete works themselves.
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II. Annotated Bibliography
Abbott, Kenneth W., Trust But Verify: The Production of
Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International
Agreements, 26 Cornell Int'l L.J. 1 (1993). (le, 2).
Develops a modified rational choice theory of compliance that
assumes that self-interested states can be motivated to cooperate,
provided that uncertainties as to other states' intentions and
actions that impede cooperation can be reduced through a
combination of verification and assurance procedures. Employs
iterated prisoners' dilemma to the study of several arms control
regimes to support the hypothesis that enhanced monitoring and
verification are complementary strategies that promote
compliance by increasing transparency, equalizing information,
and enhancing payoffs for cooperation. Suggests that the
appropriate package of measures is specific to each treaty
member and that general theories of compliance are perhaps
beyond the state of the discipline, at least in the area of arms
control.
Aceves, William J., Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal
Scholarship: A Study of Equitable Distribution, 39 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 299 (2001). (3, 4, 5).
Imports insights from Critical Legal Studies [CLS] metatheory
to reinforce the central premise of legitimacy theory and
transnational legal process theory: that compliance is a function
of the degree to which substance and process of a legal regime is
generally perceived as fair and inclusive of all stakeholders.
Suggests that existing international institutional designs lack
legitimacy because they fail to incorporate many subnational
groups. Faults the principle of equitable distribution for
broadening the inclusiveness of institutions with regard to states
but perpetuating the exclusion of subnational organizations,
groups, and people. Suggests, but does not specify, that a
deconstructivist program for enhancing the fairness of
international law is the proper direction for the marriage of CLS
and ILC theories.
Alder, Jacqueline & Lugten, Gaul, Frozen Fish Block: How
Committed are North Atlantic States to Accountability,
Conservation and Management of Fisheries?, 26 Marine Pol'y 345
(2002). (2, 10).
Surmises that compliance rates are positively correlated with
2004]
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national wealth. Cautions that many states, without regard to
wealth, often substitute instrument compliance, defined as the
ratification of an international agreement to "satisfy the public
face of international law," and appease domestic constituencies
without the intent to actually alter national behaviors for genuine
compliance.
Aldrich, George H., Compliance with the Law: Problems and
Prospects, in Effecting Compliance (Hazel Fox & Michael Meyer,
eds., 2000). (5, 6).
Lists major causal factors of noncompliance as ignorance of
legal obligations, skepticism as to the efficacy of enforcement
measures, and absence of effective monitoring and dispute-
resolution mechanisms. Suggests that domestic incorporation of
international law is a necessary condition precedent to
compliance. Regards the project of effecting compliance with
the laws of war as the major challenge of the contemporary
international legal order.
Alvarez, Jose E., Why Nations Behave, 19 Mich. J. Int'l. L. 303
(1998). (7).
Maps out the immediate post-Cold War origins of ILC and
surveys convergence of international law and international
relations scholarship in the form of several emerging theories,
including managerialism, liberalism, enforcement theory, and
constructivism. Suggests that the various divergent ILC theories
may ultimately converge around transnational legal process
theory, which posits that internalization of cooperative norms in
domestic law and legal institutions fosters the progressive
evolution of rule-governed cooperation.
American Society of International Law, How are Nations
Behaving?, 96 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 205 (2002). (7, 9).
Hypothesizes that failure to accede to international legal regimes
may be the functional equivalent of noncompliance, particularly
for hegemonic states. Notes that recent empirical scholarship
has called into question the presumption that compliance is the
rule rather than the exception, yet notes further that empiricism
in the ILC field is impeded by limitations on data, selection
biases, difficulties in generalizing from limited data sets and
from one issue-area to another, and methodological obstacles to
conceptualizing compliance. Describes the state of the
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discipline as rife with theoretical divergence yet ripe for future
discoveries on the basis of a dynamic interdisciplinary research
agenda.
Ardia, David S., Does the Emperor Have No Clothes?
Enforcement of International Laws Protecting the Marine
Environment, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 497 (1998). (le, 2).
Sketches the limitations of the enforcement model of ILC in
regard to international marine environmental protection,
including lack of clarity as to jurisdiction, the costliness of
sanctions, and the abundance of violations by non-state actors.
Proposes that successful enforcement requires more effective
detection of noncompliance which, in turn, requires enhanced
monitoring. Posits that NGOs have a role to play as compliance
monitors.
Arend, Anthony Clark, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law
and International Politics, 38 Va. J. Int'l L. 107 (1998). (li, 7).
Surveys and critiques theories of ILC. Argues that
constructivism, which regards compliance as a function of the
congruence between the socially-constructed normative
preferences of key states and individuals, on the one hand, and
formal legal rules, on the other, provides the greatest insight into
explanation and prediction of patterns of state compliance.
Bailey, Robert A., Why Do States Violate the Law of War? A
Comparison of Iraqi Violations in Two Gulf Wars, 27 Syracuse J.
Int'l L. & Com. 103 (2000). (2, 8).
Examines the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and the 1990-1991 Gulf
War and rejects the central premise of enforcement theory:
sanctions or the threat of reprisal are sufficient to induce
compliance with legal obligations. Suggests that variance in
compliance with the laws of war as between states is attributable
primarily to individual-level psychological attributes of
decision-makers responsible for compliance decisions.
Concludes that, in certain situations, failures to comply with
legal regimes may be inexplicable through strategic, military,
political, or even rational justification.
Baxter, Richard, Forces for Compliance with the Law of War, 20
Am. Soc. Int'l L. 82 (1964). (1b, 3, 5, 8).
Treats individuals as the primary subjects of the laws of war.
Develops one of the earliest articulations of enforcement theory
within the ILC canon. Regards compliance with the
2004]
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international laws of war as a function of whether the domestic
laws of national states create adequate punitive sanctions and
whether domestic military institutions effectively investigate and
prosecute offenses.
Beyerlin, Ulrich & Marauhn, Thilo, Law-Making and Law-
Enforcement in International Environmental Law After the 1992
Rio Conference (1997). (le, 2, 5).
Argues that the most effective means of achieving compliance
with international environmental law is a flexible and ad hoc
strategy of law-enforcement based on partnership rather than
traditional, repressive means of law-enforcement, such as
unilateral sanctions or reprisals. Describes as "compliance
control" procedures of reporting, monitoring, fact-finding, and
consultation designed to reduce conflict and tension between
states. Describes as "compliance assistance" the provision of
environmental education and training, personnel, administrative
and legislative support, and technology transfers to less-
developed states.
Bhattacharyya, Rupa, Establishing a Rule-of-Law International
Criminal Justice System, 31 Tex. Int'l L.J. 57 (1996). (3, 5).
Argues that compliance with international criminal law is a
function of the degree to which the substantive rules are widely
perceived as legitimate. Predicts that formalization of
international criminal law will correlate with increased
compliance. Concludes that the success of international
criminal legal institutions, such as the International Criminal
Court, will hinge upon voluntary compliance which, in turn, will
require its substantive law as well as its procedures to be widely
perceived as legitimate.
Bird, Robert C., Procedural Challenges to Environmental
Regulation of Space Debris, 40 Am. Bus. L.J. 635 (2003). (li, 8).
Dismisses sanctions or other mechanisms recommended by
enforcement theory as useful ways of promoting cooperation
regarding the control of space debris. Counters with a
constructivist account that credits epistemic communities of
scientists with responsibility for generating norms, securing
compliance with legal rules and incorporating these norms
through the mobilization of shame or the use of peer pressure.
Argues that government officials who must ultimately determine
whether to comply with resulting regimes are sensitive to and
dependent upon the scientific community and will be
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discouraged from noncompliance by their scientific advisors,
who would suffer shame if they did not dissuade officials from
noncompliance.
Bradford, William C., In the Minds of Men: A Theory of
Compliance with the Laws of War, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (2005). (1k,
2, 6, 7, 8, 9).
Surveys and critiques existing ILC theories. Develops a
personality-based theory to explain and predict compliance with
the law of war regime governing anticipatory self-defense.
Describes the use of simulation research to test and refine
personality theories of ILC.
Bradley, Curtis A., Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the
Internationalist Conception, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 529 (1999). (la, 3,
5).
Suggests that U.S. interest in international legal compliance is
structurally subordinate to its commitment to federalism and its
dualist legal system. Implies that monist legal systems are,
ceterus paribus, more likely to comply with international law
than dualist systems, which regard domestic law as occupying
the apex in the hierarchy of legal sources.
Brimeyer, Benjamin L., Bananas, Beef, and Compliance in the
World Trade Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Process to Achieve Compliance from Superpower
Nations, 10 Minn. J. Global Trade 133 (2001). (2, 3, 6).
Contends that the WTO Dispute Settlement Process has failed to
achieve compliance because it has yet to earn the general
perception of legitimacy, both substantive and procedural.
Queries whether available sanctions may be less onerous than
reputational penalties for noncompliance. Implies that
international economic law may trigger sovereignty concerns
that predispose self-interested states toward noncompliance.
Brunnre, Jutta, A Fine Balance: Facilitation and Enforcement in
the Design of a Compliance Regime for the Kyoto Protocol, 13
Tul. Envtl. L.J. 223 (2000). (lb/e, 2, 6).
Examines the negotiations toward the Kyoto Protocol
compliance regime. Queries, as a result of the empirical
evidence, whether high rates of compliance with legal regimes
may be a function of the limited degree of behavioral
modification demanded thereby and whether compliance with
legal regimes is inversely related to the extent to which
2004]
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substantive commitments require states to depart from the
conduct in which they would have engaged absent the regime.
Theorizes that the proper compliance strategy for any given
regime is situated along a "persuasive continuum," stretching
from purely facilitative measures at one extreme to purely
punitive measures at the other.
Cassel, Douglass, Does International Human Rights Law Make a
Difference?, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 121 (2001). (le/g/i, 2, 5).
Attributes compliance with international human rights law to
multiple sources of causation, including the diffusion of
behavioral norms, the reconstruction of individual and group
identities around its protective principles, the incorporation of
international treaties in domestic legal systems, and the
increased availability of international and regional judicial fora
with jurisdiction over claims of violations by states. Suggests
that the effectiveness of international human rights law is further
affected by intervening contextual variables, such as the political
and cultural nature of domestic governments and the relative
threat to the survival of states at a given moment. Concedes the
difficulty in submitting this hypothesis to empirical testing.
Charlesworth, Hilary, The Unbearable Lightness of Customary
International Law, 92 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 44 (1998). (3, 5,
10).
Examines the consequences of the participation of non-state
actors upon the formation of customary international law.
Predicts a "compliance paradox" wherein the engagement of
non-state actors increases the perception of fairness in the
development of custom but erodes consensus, weakens the
normative strength of resulting legal rules, and allows state
governments greater freedom to be selective in accepting only
those legal obligations that correspond with their interests.
Queries whether the participation of non-state actors in the
formation of customary international law may ultimately erode
the pursuit of justice through law.
Charney, Jonathan L., Compliance with International Soft Law, in
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms
in the International System (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). (7, 9).
Surveys ILC theories by identifying a series of variables
relevant to the phenomenon of compliance. Treats linkages
between the norms that underlie legal regimes and a host of
procedural, moral, and material considerations as the most
[Vol. 30
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMPLIANCE
relevant to explanations and predictions of compliance.
Chayes, Abram & Chayes, Antonia Handler, The New
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory
Agreements, (1995). (le, 7).
Posits that states are naturally imbued with a propensity to
comply with international law. Regards instances of
noncompliance as exceptional and attributable not primarily to
deliberate violation but rather to either a lack of precision in
ambiguous or indeterminate treaties or a lack of technical
capacity that prevents states willing to comply from physically
doing so. Considers enforcement measures or sanctions an
expensive "waste of time" and maintains that consultation,
negotiation, and persuasion are sufficient to adjust preferences
and steer states back into conformity. Concludes that, because
compliance problems are largely managerial, enhancement of
the capacities of weaker and poorer states and organization of
compliance efforts by powerful states willing to bear
management costs are the keys to enhancing the effectiveness of
international law.
Cuellar, Mariano-Florentino, Reflections on Sovereignty and
Collective Security, 40 Stan. J. Int'l L. 211 (2004). (le/h, 2, 9).
Evaluates the success of the U.N. system in providing for
collective security. Suggests that compliance failures are often
the product of a failure of domestic sovereignty in which the
central government loses the capacity to prevent violations of
law by subnational actors. Argues that while the international
legal regime governing collective security is not self-enforcing,
state behaviors can be causally transformed by law to the extent
that the regime is (1) perceived as legitimate and, thus, the costs
associated with behavior consistent with the regime decrease
accordingly, or (2) the regime enhances collective action and,
thereby, decreases the costs of employing enforcement
measures.
D'Amato, Anthony, The Concept of Human Rights in
International Law, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1110 (1982). (la, 3).
Suggests that the limited reach of universal judicial jurisdiction
and the paralysis of the U.N. collective security system due to
the exercise of veto powers, hobble the effectiveness of
sanctions, the primary coercive modality within the enforcement
model of compliance. Notes that the only universally effective
mechanism for ensuring compliance with international law
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remains the traditional system of retortion and reprisal.
Concludes that the ineffectiveness of enforcement suggests not
that scholars and practitioners should abandon efforts to enhance
compliance but that compliance with international human rights
law is ultimately a matter not of law but of politics and morality.
Di Mento, Joseph F.C., Process, Norms, Compliance, and
International Environmental Law, 18 J. Envt'l L. & Litig. 251
(2003). (1g/i, 5).
Surveys ILC theories using a "Transactional Norm Forming
Model" that amalgamates elements of constructivism and
transnational legal process theories. The model contends that
compliance is a function of the social construction of states and
relevant elites that is consistent with the normative content of
legal regimes as well as the degree to which these regimes are
incorporated in domestic legal systems. Traces the intellectual
roots of the proposed theory.
Downs, George W., Danish, Kyle W. & Barsoom, Peter N., The
Transformational Model of International Regime Design: Triumph
of Hope or Experience, 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 465 (2000).
(I e/g/i, 2, 3, 6, 9).
Postulates that the "transformationalist" premise, that weak or
"soft law" regimes in which horizontal negotiation, cooperation,
and "carrots" induce states to cooperate are more effective than
vertical regimes in which coercive enforcement measures,
"sticks," are used to discipline noncompliers, is demonstrably
false. Demonstrates systematic empirical support for this
critical postulate by analysis of various environmental and arms
control agreements. Concedes the power of discourse and
negotiation to promote interest transformation in individual and
small group settings but faults transformational theory for failing
to account for how convergence of interests and identities at the
individual and group level percolates upward to influence the
preferences of states. Concludes that regimes designed with the
transformational model may actually retard compliance.
Downs, George W., Rocke, David M. & Barsoom, Peter N., Is the
Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?,
50 Int'l Org. 379 (1996). (lb, 3, 6, 10).
Critiques the selection bias in managerial theory that leads to
overestimation of the extent of compliance with international
law. Contends that compliance, particularly in issue-areas of
"high politics," is highly improbable in the absence of robust
[Vol. 30
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMPLIANCE
enforcement mechanisms that establish a deterrent regime.
Employs the concept of "depth of cooperation" to examine
several legal regimes and concludes that states may, in order to
preserve the perception of compliance, be avoiding substantive
commitments that would obligate significant behavioral
transformations.
Duruigbo, Emeka, International Relations, Economics and
Compliance with International Law: Harnessing Common
Resources to Protect the Environment and Solve Global Problems,
31 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 177 (2001). (6, 7, 10).
Calls for a shift from the concept of compliance to one of
"effectiveness," defined as the degree to which legal regimes
effect behavioral transformations consistent with the norms
underlying those regimes. Suggests that the effectiveness of
legal regimes is not as great as legalization theorists maintain.
Adopts the managerialist position that enhancement of state
capacities should be a primary method of enhancing the
effectiveness of environmental pollution prevention regimes and
proposes means to achieve greater effectiveness of international
environmental law.
Ehrmann, Markus, Procedures of Compliance Control in
International Environmental Treaties, 13 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. &
Pol'y 377 (2002). (le, 2, 9).
Examines the function of non-compliance procedures in several
international environmental treaties. Concludes that the
majority of noncompliance is unintentional and the consequence
of technical and resource incapacities. Eschews enforcement as
costly and counterproductive. Advocates a "partnership
method" for managing compliance whereby enhancing the
capacity of noncompliers takes precedence over enforcement
and consultation and negotiation, rather than sanctions, are
employed to resolve compliance disputes.
Falk, Richard A., On Identifying and Solving the Problem of
Compliance with International Law, 58 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 1
(1964). (5, 9).
Describes the primary epistemological problem in measuring
compliance as uncertainty as to the specific behavioral
obligation required by the legal rule in question. Contends that
resolution of uncertainty requires the intervention of a neutral
and objective third party that can render an authoritative
interpretation of the substantive meaning of the obligation at
20041
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issue between parties. Suggests that independent international
law experts, provided they are not in service to their states of
nationality, or, in the alternative, supranational institutions,
negotiations, or the quasi-legislative process of customary
international legal formation can compensate for the deficiencies
of international adjudication of compliance disputes.
Florini, Ann, The Evolution of International Norms, 40 Int'l Stud.
Q. 363 (1996). (li, 5, 7).
Defends the causal significance of norms in prompting
compliance with international law. Surveys and critiques
existing theories of ILC. Adopts the insights of neo-Darwinism
to advance the hypothesis that cooperative norms evolve in the
manner of natural species and constitute a form of cultural
inheritance upon which compliance can be grounded and
extended.
Fisher, Roger, Improving Compliance with International Law
(1981). (lg/k, 3, 5, 8).
Attributes responsibility for compliance with international law
to the individuals at the apex of the state hierarchy, to whom
international legal regimes are ultimately directed and upon
whom decisions with regard to compliance ultimately rest.
Highlights the causal significance of religious, moral, cultural,
and psychological sources of normative prescription and
proscription to individual compliance decisions. Regards
reputational concerns, threat of enforcement, and reciprocal
effects of compliance as theoretically significant but considers
the degree to which normative content reflected in international
legal regimes is incorporated in domestic legislation and given
effect in domestic courts and institutions as the most important
determinants of state compliance.
Franck, Thomas M., Fairness in International Law and Institutions
(1995). (lh).
Posits a direct correlation between a regime's legitimacy-
defined as the widespread perception that its institutions arose
and operate in accordance with just procedures and that its rules
are clear and connected to principles of reason, justice, morality,
or other first principles-and compliance. Predicts that, as
between two legal regimes that are equally legitimate, the
regime expressing the most moral content will reap the greatest
compliance. Explains the evolution of legitimacy as a discursive
process in which a variety of actors, including individuals and
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groups, conceive of and propound norms and exhort others to
adhere to them on the ground that they are procedurally and
substantively fair and in so doing create a transnational
perception that legal regimes incorporating such norms are or
would be legitimate.
Frischmann, Brett, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of
International Law, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 679 (2003). (lc/e, 2, 6).
Draws from and integrates managerial theory, enforcement
theory, and more kinetic rational choice theories to offer a
dynamic game-theoretic model hypothesizing that self-interested
and rational states anticipate that incentives to defect from
international agreements evolve over time and that, as a
consequence, states plan for legal commitments to evolve in
order to preserve positive incentives to comply while limiting
the costs of enforcement. Applies game-theory models to
explain empirical data concerning compliance with international
environmental law and trade law and contends that states pursue
three types of compliance strategies: Type I - focused on
adjusting states' incentives to comply by altering payoff
structures (the expected costs and benefits of (non)compliance);
Type II - focused on facilitating cooperation by reducing
transaction costs and uncertainty as the legal regime evolves;
and Type III - focused on maintaining cooperation and
improving regime effectiveness by dynamically adjusting
commitments over time. Queries, albeit tacitly, whether
scholars should abandon the development of a unified theory of
ILC in favor of issue-area-specific theories.
Gerhart, Peter M., Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory-
TRIPS as a Substantive Issue, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 357
(2000). (4, 7, 10).
Previews a series of symposium articles that address compliance
with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property. Postulates a link between compliance and the
substantive legitimacy of the legal rules in question. Posits that
enforcement of international intellectual property law is
ultimately too costly standing alone and that a combination of
modalities, including public enforcement, private enforcement,
and voluntary compliance is the optimal strategy for enhancing
effectiveness. Suggests that the conception of international
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
intellectual property law as fundamentally "Western" or
capitalist stands as a barrier to the internalization of norms
favoring voluntary compliance in underdeveloped states.
Ginsburg, Tom & McAdams, Richard H., Adjudicating in
Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute
Resolution, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1229 (2004). (le, 2, 5, 6).
Rejects the realist presumption that the international system is
anarchic and presumes, instead, that states are inherently prone
to coordinate, if not necessarily cooperate. Offers a game-
theoretic explanation for the phenomenon of compliance with
adjudicative decisions of international judicial fora, which lack
enforcement power. Contends that states seek the independent,
unbiased expertise of international judicial fora in order to
resolve factual ambiguities and preserve the prospects for future
coordination. Concludes that a general theory of compliance
may potentially be constructed that will offer explanations and
predictions across a broad range of issue-areas of international
relations.
Goldsmith, Jack, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and
International Law, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 959 (2000). (2, 3, 8, 9).
Reviews Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy
(1999). Surveys theories of ILC. Expresses realist skepticism
about the independent efficacy of international law, particularly
in relation to the use of force. Criticizes international legal
academics for deliberately failing to employ methodological
techniques necessary to develop falsifiable theories. Elaborates
a series of methodological obstacles to developing and testing
ILC theories in the path of international legal academics.
Goldsmith, Jack L. & Posner, Eric A., A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999). (ic, 2, 3, 5).
Addresses compliance with customary international law from a
rational choice perspective and with empirical methods. Rejects
the notion that states feel any compliance pull and rejects the
notion that norms are significant sources of behavioral
constraint. Posits that domestic courts are, in effect, agents
whose purpose it is to implement national interests through their
interpretation and application of customary international law.
Adopts the realist conclusion that law is epiphenomenal and
treats compliance as the result of the convergence of state
interests with rules.
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Goldsmith, Jack L. & Posner, Eric A., International Agreements:
A Rational Choice Approach, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 113 (2003). (1c,
9).
Dismisses the causal significance of norms in explanations of
state compliance with international agreements. Regards treaties
and other positive or formal sources of law as no more binding
than, and consequently no more likely to secure compliance
than, informal agreements. Explains formal legalization as a
means of signaling seriousness about the commitment to be
bound by international agreements but discounts reputational
considerations where a reputation for compliance is not
inherently valuable in the given issue-area. Argues that the
coincidence of the self-interests of rational states is the root
cause of cooperative behavior and identifies the convergence of
interests as the key to enhancing compliance.
Goldsmith, Jack L. & Posner, Eric A., The Limits of International
Law (2005). (1c, 2, 7, 9).
Surveys and critiques ILC theories. Explains compliance with
international law as the choice of rational states that maximizes
their interests in the accumulation of power or other goods.
Tests a comprehensive theory of international law with
empirical evidence across a range of issue-areas, including
human rights and trade, and offers normative prescriptions on
the basis of findings.
Goodman, Ryan & Jinks, Derek, How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 Duke L.J. 1
(2004). (If/i/k, 2, 7, 8, 9).
Argues that states are susceptible to socialization designed to
encourage them to embrace and comply with normative
requirements in the issue-area of human rights. Differentiates a
program of normative "acculturation" from earlier constructivist
theories. Distinguishes coercion and persuasion, the two most
common implementation mechanisms, from acculturation and
describes how a program that mobilizes social and cultural
pressures can lead states to conform their conduct. Specifies
some of the psychological micro-processes through which
acculturation reconstructs individual, and ultimately state,
identities and preferences.
Goodman, Ryan & Jinks, Derek, Measuring the Effects of Human
Rights Treaties, 14 Eur. J. Int'l L. 171 (2003). (2, 7, 9).
Critiques the hypothesis that increased legalization may
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correlate with decreased compliance. Surveys existing ILC
theories. Defines the central empirical project within ILC as the
identification of the necessary conditions for the domestic
incorporation of international norms into state practice.
Cautions against the use of traditional quantitative methods of
theory generation and testing, such as multivariate statistics,
given the state of the discipline and the paucity of data.
Goodman, Ryan & Jinks, Derek, Toward an Institutional Theory
of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1749 (2003). (li/j, 2, 6).
Tests the hypothesis that a distinction must be drawn between
"high politics" and "low politics" in respect to state propensities
to comply with international legal regulation, with effects most
pronounced in the issue-area of national security. Examines the
organizational-cultural approach to explaining the transnational
tendencies of national military bureaucracies to eschew
particular methods and means of warfare even where such
methods and means are not unlawful. Concludes that states are
socially constructed by the preferences of national military
bureaucracies, that these preferences are organized at the
international level, and that even in the issue-area of national
security states can be socialized to comply with legal rules that
tap these common normative preferences.
Greenwood, Christopher, Ensuring Compliance with the Law of
Armed Conflict, in Control Over Compliance with International
Law (William E. Butler ed., 1991). (lb/k, 3, 6).
Identifies failures of compliance with the laws of war as
emanating from three causes: (1) lack of discipline or pathology
of individual soldiers; (2) deliberate state policies intended to
gain strategic advantage over enemy states; and (3) lack of
clarity as to the substantive content of the legal rules. Regards
the threat of reprisal as the most potent force for ensuring
compliance with the laws of war, and regards reputational
concerns and normative commitments as far less significant
sources of restraint. Treats armed conflict as qualitatively
different in terms of its ability to be regulated from other issue-
areas of law.
Guzman, Andrew T., A Compliance-Based Theory of
International Law, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823 (2002). (If, 2, 6, 7).
Surveys existing theories of compliance. Rejects the theoretical
significance of sub-state levels of analysis and presumes that
states are self-interested unitary actors. Contends that states
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comply with international law in order to develop and preserve
the benefits of a reputation for compliance and that the potential
compliance is, thus, to some degree bounded by the importance
of reputation within particular issue-areas of international
relations. Concedes that reputation is less important in issue-
areas of "high politics," such as armed conflict, arms control,
and territory, than in issue-areas of "low politics," such as
economics and environmental protection. States that future ILC
research should concentrate within issue-areas in which state
reputation matters.
Haas, Peter M., Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from
International Relations and Comparative Politics, in Commitment
and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the
International System (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). (2, 5, 7, 9).
Surveys ILC theories and describes the state of knowledge
regarding international legal compliance as underdeveloped and
under theorized. Enumerates epistemological and
methodological problems in evaluating compliance, including
problems in conceptualizing compliance, false reporting, and
unintentional noncompliance. Describes methodological tools
whereby the study of compliance can be systematized, including
process tracing, aggregate analysis of treaties, multivariate
analysis, and counterfactual studies. Suggests that the primary
impediment to compliance is the unwillingness of states to pay
the political costs to discipline self-interested elements of
domestic polities for whom compliance runs counter to their
interests.
Haas, Peter M., Why Comply, or Some Hypotheses in Search of
an Analyst, in International Compliance with Nonbinding Accords
(Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997). (ld, 5, 7, 9).
Describes methodological issues in measuring compliance and
demands that ILC theories be supported by empirical evidence.
Surveys ILC theories to map the contours of the ILC field and
sketch a research agenda. Postulates an institutionalist theory
that suggests that wealthy, liberal democratic states may be
simultaneously more capable of complying and more
domestically responsive to the preferences of individuals and
groups who desire compliance. Thus, wealthy, liberal
democratic states are systematically more likely to comply than
poorer, non-liberal states.
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Handl, Ginther, Compliance Control Mechanisms and
International Environmental Obligations, 5 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp.
L. 29 (1997). (6, 10).
Hypothesizes that state interests in ensuring compliance are
directly proportional to the complexity of an international legal
regime and the costs of complying. Emphasizes that, in
multilateral treaties, state practice of parties can have the effect
of modifying international legal obligation, making it still more
difficult to evaluate compliance. Advocates semi-formal peer
review procedures whereby parties to multilateral conventions
can convene to specify obligations, establish more transparent
procedures for determining compliance, and "fine-tune"
enforcement measures.
Hathaway, Oona, Between Power and Principle: A Political
Theory of International Law, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. - (2005). (ic/f, 2,
5,7,9).
Classifies ILC literature into rational actor and normative
models and surveys their primary hypotheses. Analyzes
empirical evidence of state practice under human rights and
environmental treaties. Synthesizes key elements of rational
choice and reputational theories and concludes that state
compliance decisions are shaped by the legal incentives
engendered by domestic and transnational enforcement of
international law as well as by the non-legal incentives created
by the reactions of external political actors in response to state
compliance decisions. Offers suggestions for future research in
the ILC subfield.
Hathaway, Oona, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,
111 Yale L.J. 1935 (2002). (ic/f, 2, 6, 7, 9).
Surveys existing ILC theories in the five areas of human rights
law: genocide, torture, fair and public trials, civil liberties, and
political representation of women. Notes the lack of
methodological sophistication of international legal scholarship
and advocates the introduction of empirical methods to harden
the discipline. Conducts quantitative investigation of
compliance human rights treaties and concludes that, although
external normative pressures are successful in inducing state
accessions, state behavior is largely unaffected by legalization.
Indicates that states are largely unaffected because a lack of
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effective monitoring and enforcement erodes any incentives for
self-interested states to modify conduct to meet treaty
obligations.
Henkin, Louis, How Nations Behave (1967). (5, 7, 8).
Initiates the first major investigation of the phenomenon of
compliance with international law. Begins the development of a
multivariate explanation for compliance that incorporates
variables from several levels of analysis, notably national values
and cultural traditions regarding attitudes toward law and
authority and attributes of the political personalities of
individual decision-makers who wield state power. Concludes
that compliance with international law is the rule rather than the
exception and that the most fruitful method of enhancing
compliance is likely to be the fostering of domestic cultures of
compliance.
Ho, Daniel E., Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do
Countries Implement the Basle Accord?, 5 J. Int'l Econ. L. 647
(2002). (If, 2, 5, 9).
Reviews institutional and economic determinants of
implementing the Balse Accord of 1988. Highlights the lack of
empirical research in the ILC subfield and notes that selection
bias erodes the significance of available studies. Challenges the
liberalist premise that democracies are inherently more
compliant with international law and counters that democratic
regimes are more corrupt and more fragmented domestically and
consequently less likely to comply than non-democratic states.
Argues, instead, that reputational concerns are central to the
establishment of compliance with "soft law" regimes and that a
reputation for compliance confers benefits in the form of a
"stamp of approval" that other states recognize as an indicator of
business worthiness.
Huang, Peter H., International Environmental Law and Emotional
Rational Choice, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 237 (2002). (ic/f, 2, 6, 8).
Complements rational choice theory by considering whether
actors are motivated by a desire to preserve their reputations.
Suggests that preferences in favor of legal compliance can be
induced by law in the sense that law modifies decisional
strategies. Posits that compliance behavior in the issue-area of
international environmental law can be molded and create self-
enforcing expectations that reduce the need for enforcement.
Models a reputational theory of international environmental law.
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Iwasawa Yuji, Evidence of Compliance in International Law,
Human Rights, and Japanese Law (1998). (2, 3, 5).
Explains slow pace of Japanese domestic incorporation of
human rights norms in terms of a traditional and homogenous
culture resistant to wholesale importation of external concepts.
Suggests that engagement of human rights NGOs has been
important to political transformation but has not had similar
influence on courts due to the dualist nature of the Japanese
legal system. Indirectly calls into question whether
transnational legal processes are universally effective in
enhancing compliance.
Jacobson, Harold K., Conceptual, Methodological and Substantive
Issues Entwined in Studying Compliance, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 569
(1998). (7, 9).
Surveys major ILC theories while noting and accounting for the
underdevelopment of the field of ILC. Distinguishes "high
politics" from "low politics" and suggests that knowledge is
likely to remain more limited in issue-areas where obligations
are less clear, such as in the case of customary international law
or in the case of newer sources of law. Calls on legal and
international relations scholars to commit more resources to
empirical study and to the empirical description of compliance
patterns as a necessary precondition to bolder theorization.
Janis, Mark W., The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 Conn. J. Int'l
L. 39 (2000). (5, 8, 9).
Conflates compliance and effectiveness. Outlines the
methodological and epistemological difficulties in evaluating
compliance with the 1950 European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, most
crucially the lack of access to complete data and the difficulty in
evaluating partial compliance. Proposes that the increased
efficacy of "Strasbourg" law can be inferred from the growth in
the membership of states' parties to the European Convention
and from the fact that disputes are submitted for judicial review.
Concedes that the ultimate determinant of compliance may be
the perception of legitimacy of a given legal regime and
recognizes that legitimacy is a subjective assessment not
susceptible to determination through legal, as opposed to
psychological, analysis.
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Joyner, Christopher C., Compliance and Enforcement in New
International Fisheries Law, 12 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 271
(1998). (5, 10).
Distinguishes compliance from effectiveness and suggests that a
high rate of compliance may be an indication that the legal
regime in question obligates little change in state behavior or is
so open to interpretation that any conduct can be described as
compliant. Examines multilateral treaties regulating commercial
fishing and contends that for legal regimes to be effective, they
must require conduct that is congruent with the self-interest of
member-states. Further argues that enforcement of international
law is dependent not upon threats of sanctions but instead upon
the deployment of positive incentives sufficient to motivate
states to comply and to prosecute noncompliant nationals.
Joyner, Christopher C., Recommended Measures Under the
Antarctic Treaty: Hardening Compliance with Soft International
Law, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 401 (1998). (2, 9).
Counters the perception of "soft law" as insufficient to generate
state compliance. Surveys the history of state practice under the
Antarctic Treaty and concludes that "soft law" enables states to
reach more precise agreements than might be possible in "hard
law" format, that state compliance with "soft law" agreements is
better than expected, and that "soft law" agreements form the
customary law nucleus for future binding obligations.
Joyner, Christopher C., Sanctions, Compliance and International
Law: Reflections on the United Nations' Experience Against Iraq,
32 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 (1991). (2).
Links the effectiveness of the enforcement model to the
transparency of the underlying norms for the violation of which
sanctions are imposed, the speed with which enforcement is
undertaken, the comprehensiveness of the sanctions regime, and
the willingness of powerful states to make material contributions
to the success of enforcement. Considers the U.N. system to be
an important site for maximizing the perception of legitimacy of
resulting enforcement measures.
Keck, Margaret F. & Sikkink, Kathryn, Activists Beyond Borders
(1998). (li, 5, 8).
Criticizes liberalism as under-theorized in regard to the process
whereby individuals and groups acquire their preferences
regarding international legal compliance. Rejects the centrality
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of the state to explanations of contemporary international
relations. Theorizes that transnational epistemic communities
consisting of uniquely situated individuals and groups highly
committed to normative programs organize within issue-areas
and diffuse their influence across national boundaries through a
combination of persuasion, socialization, and electoral pressure.
Attributes state compliance preferences and behavior to the
influence of these epistemic communities and ascribes the
evolution of norms, and compliance with these norms, to the
effects of the process whereby states and their preferences are
socially constructed.
Kelly, Claire R., Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 36
N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. _ (2004). (le/g, 2, 6).
Builds upon transnational legal process and managerial theories
and attributes compliance to the phenomenon described as
"enmeshment," which occurs when a state finds that its interests
and the substantive rules of an international legal regime are
closely related. Differentiates between issue-areas and suggests
that the greatest likelihood that a state will become enmeshed in
a particular international legal regime exists in issue-areas of
"low politics." Concludes that harnessing the capacity of
enmeshment to enhance regime effectiveness requires a high
degree of formalization-that is, the treaty language must be as
precise as parties will tolerate.
Kelly, Claire R., The Value Vacuum: Self-Enforcing Regimes and
the Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop, 22 Mich. J. Int'l L.
673 (2001). (id/i, 2, 5, 7).
Theorizes that self-enforcing regimes-treaties that create
organs with powers to impose direct sanctions on non-
compliers-by bypassing domestic sites of normative
interpretation and national identity and interest assertion, may
create negative consequences for compliance. Suggests that
enhancing compliance may require that this "normative
feedback loop" be reintegrated into the functioning of self-
enforcing regimes by creating exemptions from the operation of
legal rules or allowing non-state actors that would normally
participate in the domestic interpretive process greater
opportunities to introduce national constituency preferences into
international value and identity formation. Proposes a modified
constructivist theory that explains compliance with self-
enforcing regimes as a function of the degree to which the
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normative feedback loop is reintegrated and national
constituencies are allowed to construct shared expectations and
understandings of the rules that constitute international law.
Kelly, Claire R., Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 Va. J.
Int'l L. 545 (2004). (1c, 2, 7).
Modifies the realist premise that legal rules are epiphenomenal
to state practice by positing that, as states become "enmeshed"
in legal regimes, they come to rely upon the benefits of regime
membership, which cumulatively outweigh the costs of
compliance even in individual "hard cases." Suggests that legal
regimes, themselves, develop causal significance in explaining
and predicting compliance even within the realist account of
international relations and international law. Supports this
modified realist argument with empirical examples from a series
of regimes, including the European Union, World Trade
Organization, Law of the Sea Convention, International
Monetary Fund, and International Criminal Court.
Keohane, Robert 0., Compliance With International
Commitments: Politics Within a Framework of Law, 86 Am.
Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 176 (1992). (2, 7, 9).
Suggests that empirical studies of compliance might treat
compliance decisions as the dependent variable and the relative
power of state, the nature of international institutions, the clarity
of legal obligations, the strength of underlying norms, and links
to domestic considerations as independent variables. Surveys
ILC theories. Notes that building and testing theories requires
the synthesis of the methods of international law and
international relations-to determine whether compliance has
occurred requires legal judgment-while analyzing causal
relationships between rules and behaviors requires a resort to
social scientific methods.
Keohane, Robert 0., International Relations and International
Law: Two Optics, 38 Harv. J. Int'l L. 487 (1997). (5, 7, 9).
Bifurcates ILC into "instrumentalist" and "normative" optics,
with the former consisting of a cluster of realist, rational choice,
and enforcement theories skeptical about the significance of
norms in fostering rule-governed cooperation, and the latter a
cluster of liberal, legal process, managerial, reputational, and
constructivist theories that regard norms as having a causal
effect upon state behaviors and as capable of exerting a "pull"
toward compliance. Critiques both optics. Regards policy elites
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as crucial players in establishing and maintaining compliance.
Elaborates an agenda for future interdisciplinary research.
Kingsbury, Benedict, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of
Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L.
345 (1998). (7, 9, 10).
Challenges the notion of compliance as the mere correspondence
of behavior with legal rules and argues for the concept of
"effectiveness" as the benchmark of legal regimes. Surveys
existing theories of ILC, including realism, liberalism,
constructivism, managerialism, and transnational legal process.
Cautions against empirical research that fails to account for
causes and effects of legal rules and warns against purely
positivist theories that ignore considerations of justice and
morality.
Knop, Karen, Here and There: International Law in Domestic
Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 501 (2000). (Ig, 2, 5, 10).
Calls for a more nuanced understanding of the role of domestic
courts as agents in the enforcement of international law.
Suggests that domestic courts, because they regard international
law as persuasive and not binding authority, ultimately
transform and heterogenize international law. Implies that the
enforcement model of international legal compliance that relies
on domestic courts, or "transjudicialism," must either make
room for variations in the degree and direction of compliance
across states or else give way to international judicial fora.
Knox, John H., A New Approach to Compliance with
International Environmental Law: The Submissions Procedure of
the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 Ecology L.Q. 1
(2001). (2, 7).
Reviews two schools of thought on international compliance-
supranational adjudication and managerial model of compliance.
Contends that the role of international adjudication in promoting
compliance with international environmental law is limited, in
significant part, because states are unwilling to jeopardize
relations with other states by bringing claims against them.
Examines the function of various international regimes that
permit NGOs and/or individuals to trigger judicial review.
Concludes that permitting non-state actors and other private
parties to bring claims before international judicial tribunals or
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less formal dispute resolution mechanisms will enhance the
effectiveness of the managerial model of compliance by creating
a more factually complete and less confrontational environment.
Koh, Harold, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181
(1996). (1g, 5, 10).
Surveys ILC theories. Maintains that the key actors in
compliance are not just states, as realism postulates, but also
NGOs, institutions, and individuals. Hypothesizes that
repetitive interactions within transnational epistemic
communities consisting largely of foreign policy elites give rise
to norms favoring cooperation and that the internalization of
these norms in domestic law and legal institutions fosters the
progressive evolution of rule-governed cooperation. Suggests
that states can be induced not merely toward compliance but into
obedience, defined as voluntary compliance in the absence of
sanctions.
Koh, Harold, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale
L.J. 2599 (1997). (1g, 2, 5, 7).
Divides ILC field into two camps, the first camp is comprised of
managerialist and transnational legal process theories and
dedicated to the defense of the premise that international law is
really law and that states generally comply. The second camp is
populated by realists and rational choice theorists skeptical of
the causal significance of international law. Surveys the origins
and development of international law and elaborates on the
Chayes' managerial theory and Franck's legitimacy theory.
Presents and heuristically tests transnational legal process
theory, which postulates that repetitive interactions within
transnational epistemic communities consisting largely of
foreign policy elites give rise to norms favoring cooperation and
that the internalization of these norms in domestic law and legal
institutions fosters the progressive evolution of rule-governed
cooperation. Concludes that states can be socialized toward
obedience and not merely to enhanced compliance.
Koskenniemi, Martii, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 Mich. L.
Rev. 1947 (1990). (1g, 5).
Contends that non-legal sources of behavioral prescription and
proscription exert greater influence upon states than do legal
sources. Stresses the importance of norm inculcation within
domestic legal regimes to the promotion of compliance.
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Kratochwil, Friedrich V., Rules, Norms, and Decisions on the
Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International
Relations and Domestic Affairs (1989). (2, 3, 5, 7, 9).
Describes international law in 1989 as a primitive legal system
and attributes primary importance to domestic legal systems in
regard to the enforcement of international legal norms.
Conceptualizes noncompliance with international legal norms as
a gambit to transform, or bargain for the transformation of,
norms and rules rather than an act of lawlessness. Cautions that
attempts to enforce compliance through coercive measures are
bound to fail and urges scholars to fashion alternative methods.
Ku, Julian G., The State of New York Does Exist: How the States
Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 457
(2004). (5).
Critiques the "nationalist" conception of international relations,
which assumes the exclusion of states and advances a revisionist
model in which states, as general sovereigns, play an important
role in the interpretation of customary international law, in the
implementation of non-self-executing treaties, and in the
administration of private international law more generally.
Situates the primary locus of compliance with international law
in the constituent states of the United States and, in particular,
with state courts and legislatures. Suggests that domestic
legislation may be more effective in promoting compliance.
Concludes that affording a broader reign to the states in the
implementation of international law may better comport with
traditional notions of federalism while simultaneously enhancing
the legitimacy of international law.
Leary, Virginia A., Nonbinding Accords in the Field of Labor, in
International Compliance with Nonbinding Accord (Edith Brown
Weiss ed., 1997). (9, 10).
Argues that "compliance" is too narrow an approach to the study
of the relationship of nonbinding norms to state behavior and
that the concept of "influence" is more appropriate to the
analysis of "soft law." Admits the difficulty in measuring the
influence of soft law due to the limited dissemination of its
normative pronouncements, particularly in the field of
international labor law. Suggests that the translation of soft law
into customary international law may promote their
effectiveness but notes that this hypothesis is not yet supported
by empirical research.
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Levit, Janet Koven, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in
Argentina: Problem or Promise?, 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 281
(1999). (lg, 2, 5).
Adopts the transnational legal process premise that the
internalization of international rules and norms within the
domestic legal systems of states is the most propitious avenue
toward compliance. Examines the constitutionalization strategy
employed by the Argentine legal system and attributes
compliance failures to acknowledge deficits rather than
deliberate inaction. Concludes, consistent with constructivist
theory, that epistemic communities of human rights activists are
essential to the support of internalization strategies and
ultimately to compliance.
Levit, Janet Koven, The Dynamics of International Trade Finance
Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially Supported Export
Credits, 45 Harv. Int'l L.J. 65 (2004). (2, 7, 9).
Examines empirical data concerning the Arrangement on
Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits-a "soft-
law" framework for cooperation in the international trade and
finance issue-area-and explains a systematic pattern of
compliance as a function of the flexibility, pragmatism, and
consensus-based participatory decision-making procedures of
the Arrangement. Suggests that narrow rational choice accounts
of state compliance are belied by evidence suggesting that states
continue to cooperate even in the absence of short-term benefits
not merely because they desire the longer-term benefits of
cooperation but because participation in the regime restructures
their preferences and their identities through a dynamic and
interactive process to create inherent interests in compliance and
in membership in a social community committed to
incrementally strengthening regime norms. Concludes that
explanations of the Arrangement and of the importance of legal
rules to the establishment and effectiveness of other "soft-law"
agreements require integration of reputational and managerial
theories.
Louka, Elli, Cutting the Gordian Knot: Why International
Environmental Law is Not Only About the Protection of the
Environment, 10 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 79 (1996). (le, 5).
Attributes failure of enforcement mechanisms to create
compliance with international environmental law to the
inadequacy of resources. Suggests that the key to promoting
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compliance lies in the nurturing of transnational norm-
generating communities that inculcate norms more deeply into
state decision making and the institution of domestic incentives
that reward cooperative behavior. Concludes that the deepest
cooperation requires iterative, state-to-state negotiation and the
reconstruction and convergence of national identities.
March, James G. & Olsen, Johan P., The Institutional Dynamics of
International Political Orders, 52 Int'l Org. 943 (1998). (ld/i/k, 7,
8,9).
Articulates a theory of "new institutionalism" hypothesizing that
the development of transnational networks of domestic
bureaucracies, courts, and administrative agencies, along with
the officials who staff them, are becoming the primary agents
for the promulgation of new normative and legal regulations.
Rejects the "logic of consequences," which regards compliance
behaviors as the result of the rational calculation and pursuit of
interests, whether by individuals, organizations, or states, in
favor of a "logic of appropriateness," which suggests that
compliance behavior, along with the identities, rules, and
institutions that are theoretically significant in the explanation of
international relations more generally, is shaped by social and
moral norms that causally influence individual preferences.
Describes points of intersection between the two logics and
concludes that the complexity of international relations is such
that theoretical islands, rather than a meta-theory, should be the
focus of ILC scholars.
Mearsheimer, John J., The False Promise of International
Institutions, 19 Int'l Security 5 (1994-95), reprinted in Michael E.
Brown et al. eds., Theories of War and Peace: An International
Security Reader (1998). (la, 3).
Rejects the causal significance of law in relation to state
behaviors. Contends that states make decisions regarding
compliance with international law solely in terms of whether
such action will tilt the balance of power in their favor. Argues
that empirical evidence lends little or no support to the
proposition that cooperation can be built and sustained upon a
normative foundation.
Mitchell, Ronald, Compliance Theory: An Overview, in
Improving Compliance with International Law (James Cameron
Jacob Werksman & Peter Roderick eds., 1996). (7, 9, 10).
Surveys ILC theories. Links sources of compliance failures to
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issues of faulty regime design. Resists the tendency to equate
state behavior consistent with legal rules with compliance and
argues that claims regarding the effectiveness of legal regimes
must be subjected to empirical analysis.
Moore, David H., A Signaling Theory of Human Rights
Compliance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 879 (2003). (ic/f, 2).
Challenges the legalist assertion that compliance is the rule
rather than the exception. Surveys and briefly critiques existing
theories. Supplements rational choice theories by propounding a
"signaling theory" that explains compliance with human rights
treaties even in the absence of pressure as a strategy intended to
maintain and enhance status within a highly interrelated
community of states.
Moore, John Norton, Enhancing Compliance with International
Law: A Neglected Remedy, 39 Va. J. Int'l L. 881 (1999). (3, 6).
Cautions that too much scholarly attention is focused on the
continuing refinement and promulgation of international legal
regimes and too little upon compliance - the "greatest challenge
for the future of international law." Queries whether "high
politics" issue-areas may be less able to be regulated through
law than issue-areas of "low politics." Contends that informal
political measures, such as reprisal or reciprocal conduct, may
be more effective in promoting long-term compliance than
formal institutional mechanisms.
Morrow, James D., The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and
Legal Systems in International Politics, 31 J. Legal Stud. 41
(2002). (ib, 2, 3, 6).
Undertakes empirical analysis of compliance with the laws of
war and concludes that compliance can be secured only through
voluntarism or through effective enforcement measures. Treats
states as the relevant level of analysis. Describes the laws of
war as a series of prescription and proscriptions with regard to
particular "battle strategies" and offers a rational choice
explanation of compliance and noncompliance as self-interested
calculations of the benefits and costs of electing particular battle
strategies. Predicts noncompliance when the benefits are greater
than the associated costs imposed in reprisal. Suggests that the
capacity of law to regulate state behavior in the issue-area of
armed conflict may be more limited than in other issue-areas.
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Nakagawa, Junji, Securing Compliance in Traditional and
Contemporary International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, in
Trilateral Perspectives on International Legal Issues: From Theory
into Practice (Thomas J. Schoenbaum et al. eds., 1998). (2, 4, 9).
Examines trends in ILC and notes a theoretically significant
shift toward nontraditional methods of enhancing compliance,
including "soft law" and third-party dispute resolution
mechanisms. Notes further that the proliferation of non-state
actors and non-European states as subjects and authors of
international law may impose duties to comply upon actors that
lack the capacity to comply with legal regimes. Suggests that
the path to enhancing the efficiency of international law may be
through non-binding regimes that delegate disputes over
compliance to neutral institutions and seek to induce compliance
through positive incentives, rather than through coercion.
O'Brien, William V., Teaching Humanitarian Law in Universities
and Law Schools - The Jus In Bello in International Relations
Studies, 31 Am. U. L. Rev. 1011 (1982). (3, 6).
Recognizes the fragility of the legal regime governing the laws
of war in relation to state sovereignty and the imperatives of
security. Challenges the orthodox view that reprisal is the sole
method for ensuring compliance with the laws of war.
Concludes that the norms underlying the laws of war are so
fundamental to the maintenance of international order and
justice that states must be willing to refrain from reprisal and
submit violations to judicial determination if these normative
principles are to be protected and promoted.
O'Connell, Mary Ellen, Enforcement and the Success of
International Environmental Law, 3 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 47
(1995). (lg, 5).
Argues that compliance with international environmental law is
the rule rather than the exception and that most compliance is
voluntary in nature. Rejects enforcement, whether through
formal international legal institutions or informal reprisals, as a
means of enhancing compliance due to a host of limiting factors,
including an absence of jurisdiction or the inability to impose
effective sanctions for violations. Posits that domestic courts
may prove the most effective means of securing compliance
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with international environmental law if doctrinal and political
obstacles to adjudication of claims, such as standing, forum non
conveniens, and sovereign immunity, can be reduced.
Okuwaki, Naoya, The Changing Nature of International
Obligations: Can Voluntary Compliance Overcome the
Difficulties in the Present Nation-State System?, in Trilateral
Perspectives on International Legal Issues: From Theory into
Practice (Thomas J. Schoenbaum et al. eds., 1998). (2, 4, 9, 10).
Stresses that proper empirical measurement of the effectiveness
of a legal regime requires distinguishing lex ferenda from
crystallized international legal obligations. Distinguishes
effectiveness, measured as changes in state behaviors caused by
the rules of legal regimes, from compliance, measured as the
mere correspondence of behaviors and rules. Suggests that the
most difficult obstacle facing legal architects is the re-
negotiation of the normative content of existing legal regimes
and of customary international law to take into consideration the
divergent normative preferences of non-Westem states that did
not participate equally in the formation of these regimes.
Posner, Eric A., A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev.
297 (2003). (1c, 2, 3).
Develops a rational choice theory of compliance that explains
the laws of war as a pre-war agreement to abstain from
enumerated "battle strategies" and predicts that states will
comply with rules that limit the resort to particular methods or
means only if the benefits gained through the resort to these
methods or means are less than the sanction costs imposed by
other states in reprisal. Expresses skepticism that states will
generally comply with the laws of war. Calls for more
empiricism and greater parsimony in ILC.
Posner, Richard A., Some Economics of International Law:
Comment on Conference Papers, 31 J. Legal Stud. 321 (2002).
(1c, 3, 7).
Surveys some initial applications of rational choice theory to
ILC. Assumes that state behavior is essentially identical to that
of individuals, who are further presumed to be rational actors in
that they are self-interested and make conscious welfare-
maximizing choices. Rejects the theoretical relevance of sub-
state levels of analysis. Challenges the premise of reputational
theory that reputation is unitary and that states have a single
reputation across issue-areas. Discounts the significance of
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norms as a basis for building and maintaining compliance with
international law.
Purvis, Nigel, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law,
32 Harv. Int'l L.J. 81 (1991). (3, 4).
Presents a critical legal studies theory of international law that
rejects the primacy of states in the international system, disputes
the liberal notion that an objective moral consensus regarding
justice is possible, and challenges the determinacy of
international legal obligations. Suggests that compliance may
not, in fact, be possible given the utter indeterminacy and
incoherence of international law.
Ratner, Steven R., Does International Law Matter in Preventing
Ethnic Conflict?, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 591 (2000). (lg/k,
2, 5, 6, 7, 8).
Queries whether international law can expect to secure
compliance in cases of ethnic conflict and human rights issues
and concludes in the affirmative. Surveys and organizes ILC
field into normative and positive theoretical clusters. Analyzes
the functions of the High Commissioner on National Minorities
for the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe and
suggests that, because they fail to operationalize "soft law"
norms, existing theories are unable to explain significant forces
that induce compliance with emerging, if not codified, sources
of behavioral regulation. Articulates a "mediation theory"
which postulates that individuals are relevant actors in
international relations and that certain high-status normative
"intermediaries" can play theoretically significant roles in
promoting compliance.
Ratner, Steven R., Overcoming Temptations to Violate Human
Dignity in Times of Crisis: On the Possibilities for Meaningful
Self-Restraint, 5 Theoretical Inquiries L. 81 (2004). (li, 6).
Differentiates the prospects for nurturing compliance in regard
to issue-areas of "high politics" and "low politics." Describes
the dilemma for states facing grave crises in which the only
alternatives appear to be non-compliance with legal regimes,
particularly human rights or humanitarian law, or willing
acceptance of national catastrophe. Suggests that compliance
may be possible even during crises and national emergencies
provided states can be induced, before the crises or emergencies
arise and fundamentally transform attitudes regarding
compliance, to "tie their own hands" through pre-commitments
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to restraint.
Ratner, Steven R., Precommitment Theory and International Law:
Starting a Conversation, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 2055 (2003). (If/g, 5).
Extends domestic constitutional law "precommitment theory"
into the realm of international human rights and humanitarian
law. Notes that some states enter into international treaties
without intent to comply solely to secure reciprocity or to gain
the benefits of association rather than on the basis of agreement
with underlying norms. Builds upon reputational and signaling
theories. Suggests the seemingly related questions, of why
states "bind their hands" in advance of future temptations to
engage in specific conduct by entering into international legal
obligations and why states comply, may be entirely separate
lines of inquiry.
Raustiala, Kal, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law,
43 Va. J. Int'l L. 1 (2002). (1i, 2, 6, 7).
Surveys ILC theories to assess the influence of informal
transnational links between state officials upon compliance.
Draws empirical support from state practice for the proposition
that realism, managerialism, and transnational legal process
theory each imply a positive role for these transgovernmental
networks in enhancing compliance with treaties and with less
formal transnational agreements. Concludes, particularly in
issue-areas of great complexity and in regard to "low politics,"
that transgovernmental networks will increasingly come to
substitute for treaties as the modality to coordinate cooperation
and that scholars must retool existing ILC theories to adapt to
this transformation.
Raustiala, Kal, Compliance and Effectiveness in International
Regulatory Cooperation, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 387 (2000).
(2, 7, 9, 10).
Re-orients focus from compliance to effectiveness as the better
gauge of the function of legal regimes to modify state behavior
toward norm-governed cooperation. Surveys three existing ILC
theories: rationalism, normativism, and liberalism. Evaluates
studies to test heuristically the effectiveness of international
environmental treaties. Concludes that an empirical and
multidisciplinary approach drawing upon the insights of
international relations theories is required for international legal
regimes to become more effective.
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Saunders, Phillip M., Development Cooperation and Compliance
with International Environmental Law: Past Experience and
Future Prospects, in Trilateral Perspectives on International Legal
Issues: From Theory into Practice 86 (Thomas J. Schoenbaum et
al. eds., 1998). (le, 3).
Identifies the proliferation of "soft law" agreements, in which
states seek to express normative commitments without accepting
legal limitations on their sovereignty, as a principle impediment
to compliance. Notes that the complexity of many recent
international legal regimes, coupled with the implementation
costs such regimes impose upon members, further weakens the
prospects for compliance. Expresses skepticism about the
prospects for compliance but stresses that financial and technical
assistance for underdeveloped states is an imperative if
compliance, particularly with international environmental law, is
to advance.
Setear, John K., An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis
of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 Harv.
Int'l L.J. 139 (1996). (lc/e, 2).
Examines several arms control agreements to support a theory
that draws from managerialism and rational choice theory and
posits that treaty parties are in an iterative relationship in which
they learn over time to deepen the natural and rational
propensity to cooperate. Suggests states produce long-term
public gains by developing rules and procedures to make the
rational preference for cooperation more effective. Concludes
that obligations will gradually increase over time as the depth of
cooperation evolves and that compliance is a rational outcome.
Scott, Shirley V., The Impact on International Law of U.S.
Noncompliance, in United States Hegemony and the Foundations
of International Law 427 (Michael Byers et al. eds., 2003). (2, 9).
Suggests that the indeterminacy of international law is such that
the concept of compliance is inadequate to the development and
testing of theories and notes that many states-not just the
U.S.-have mixed records of compliance. Concludes that the
absence of a clear distinction between legal and illegal behavior
in many issue-areas of law introduces methodological
difficulties into the ILC field. Suggests that mitigation of
methodological difficulties may require selecting cases in which
a consensus is possible regarding the facts of compliance or
noncompliance.
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Shelton, Dinah, Compliance with International Human Rights Soft
Law, in International Compliance with Nonbinding Accords
(Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997). (9,10).
Distinguishes the study of compliance of "soft law," or
nonbinding declarations of norms, from treaty-based
international legal obligations. Disputes the managerialist
assertion that compliance cannot be measured empirically.
Recognizes the heightened difficulty in operationalizing "soft
law" compliance and in acquiring, evaluating, and scoring
compliance data. Concedes that establishing causality between
"soft law" rules and behaviors is particularly difficult and
potentially beyond the methodological capacity of the discipline.
Shen, Jianming, The Basis of International Law: Why Nations
Observe, 17 Dick. J. Int'l L. 287 (1999). (lh, 7).
Develops an ILC taxonomy that divides the field into naturalist
and positivist theories and their variants. Enumerates several
theoretically significant variables to the explanation and
prediction of state compliance, including national-cultural
attitudes toward law and legal authority, the salience of
reputation in the personal calculus of head decision-makers, and
the likelihood of sanctions or reprisals in the event of
noncompliance. Concludes that compliance is the inherent
preference of states because the very existence of law creates a
normative force that impels them toward compliance.
Shihata, Ibrahim F. I., Implementation, Enforcement, and
Compliance with International Environmental Agreements-
Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank's Experience, 9
Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 37 (1996). (2).
Embraces the managerialist hypothesis that attributes
compliance failures to a lack of technical capacity. Generalizes
from the World Bank experience to suggest that enforcement
measures are ill-suited to enhancing compliance with
international environmental law. Recommends packages of
technical support and transnational dispute resolution
mechanisms to enable states to harmonize interests and
expectations and, thereby, enhance compliance.
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Simmons, Beth A., Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance:
International Institutions and Territorial Disputes, 46 J. Conflict
Resol. 829 (2002). (ic/f, 2, 6, 9).
Contends that rational, self-interested states enter into
international legal agreements to achieve outcomes and reap
gains not available through independent action or informal
negotiation alone. Argues further that the mere existence of
legally binding rules are causally significant in transforming
state preferences and decisions, even in regard to issue-areas of
"high politics" such as territory, because rules impose costs
upon decisions not to comply. Predicts that as operant norms
diffuse and solidify, reputational costs associated with
noncompliance rise along with the prospects for compliance.
Simmons, Beth A., International Law and International Relations:
Scholarship at the Intersection of Principles and Politics, 95 Asil
271 (2001). (2, 3, 6, 9).
Laments the shallowness of interdisciplinary collaboration
between international law and international relations in the
investigation of the phenomenon of compliance. Describes the
skepticism of international legal scholars as the proposition that
legal rules can be operationalized as variables and integrated
into theoretical models that, in turn, can be tested with the
assistance of social science methodologies. Suggests that if
interdisciplinary collaborations continue to find that law exerts
no or little independent causal influence upon state compliance
behaviors, the likelihood of future collaboration within the ILC
field will diminish.
Simmons, Beth A., Money and the Law: Why Comply with the
Public International Law of Money?, 25 Yale J. Int'l L. 323
(2000). (ic/f, 2, 7, 9).
Conceptualizes international financial law as a signaling device
used by states-parties to relevant treaties designed to
demonstrate "good citizenship" to markets and other states and,
in turn, to reap the associated benefits of trade and investment.
Surveys and faults much of the literature in ILC for
methodological and epistemological shortcomings, including
lack of sufficient rigor and an absence of empiricism. Explains
and predicts compliance as the strategy to preserve these
reputational benefits and concludes that those states most
sensitive to reputational effects will be most likely to comply.
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Slaughter, Anne-Marie, International Law in a World of Liberal
States, 6 Eur. J. Int'l L. 503 (1995). (ld, 5, 7).
Posits that the key actors regarding compliance are not states but
rather individuals, institutions, organizations, and other
components of civil society. Contends that it is the nature of the
domestic politics predominating within state borders that
determines the composition of representative governments and,
in turn, the willingness of states to subordinate sovereignty to
normative and, thus, legal regulation. Theorizes that liberal
democracies are inherently more committed to the "rule of law,"
more prone to absorb international legal obligations into their
domestic legal orders and to diffuse these obligations through
foreign policy bureaucracies, and more willing to permit interest
groups to mobilize mass electoral support for international legal
norms than non-democratic states. Explains and predicts
compliance as a function of the degree to which the aggregation
of the preferences of key domestic individuals and groups
directs the representative state toward norm-following and legal
regulation.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, A New World Order (2004). (5, 7).
Describes transnational government networks-informal links
between counterpart state officials that transcend national
boundaries-as important resources for enhancing capacity for
compliance and building upon the natural propensity of states
toward voluntary compliance. Suggests further that government
networks reinforce cooperative norms and strengthen the
international rule of law by disseminating administrative
resources and information.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie & Raustiala, Kal, International Law,
Intemationl Relations, and Compliance, in Handbook of
International Relations 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
(7, 9, 10).
Conceptualizes the field of ILC and surveys existing theories.
Traces the intellectual history of ILC. Sketches a research
agenda.
Smith, Edwin M., Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms
Control Agreements, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1549 (1991). (1c, 2).
Builds upon dynamic theories of cooperation and iterated game
theory to develop a rational choice account that explains arms
control agreements as the result of self-interested states learning
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o cooperate and jointly share the relative gains available through
compliance with gradually evolving legal regimes. Suggests
treaties are but a part of a broader pattern of non-legal
relationships between parties and that formal institutions are
unnecessary to support compliance, as parties value and desire
to maintain and improve this relational pattern and converged
expectations and the informal mechanism of reciprocity are
adequate to the task. Indicates that it may be possible to
extrapolate the study's findings to complex issue-areas, such as
trade, environmental management, and technology.
Stone, Christopher D., Common But Differentiated
Responsibilities in International Law, 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 276
(2004). (c/e, 2, 6).
Criticizes procedural rational choice approaches. Expands the
concept of "common but differentiated responsibilities," which
postulates that states are impressed with equal obligations but
vary in their capacities for compliance and suggests that
enforcement costs will be reduced if more capable states make
allowances for the less capable. Elaborates a model for
negotiating differential responsibilities that amalgamates
managerial and rational choice theories. Applies the model to
the Kyoto Protocol.
Strauss, Andrew L., Overcoming the Dysfunction of the
Bifurcated Global System: The Promise of a People's Assembly, 9
Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 489 (1999). (li/k, 4, 8).
Attributes responsibility for, state compliance and non-
compliance with international law to the elites at the apex of
state power. Contends that, in practice, the principle of the
formal equality of states gives way to a hierarchy in which
powerful states are able to prevent the effectiveness of
international treaties by mobilizing opposition, as in the case of
the United States and the Kyoto Protocol. Advocates an
international legislative body, termed Global Peoples Assembly,
with the power to create and enforce laws directly against states
and individuals. Calls for "compliance from the inside out"
whereby states, stripped of their status as the sole authors and
primary enforcers of international law, would lose the power to
determine whether their nationals complied in favor of this
representative assembly, through which the will of their
nationals would be given direct effect.
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Sullivan, Scott M., Changing the Premise of International Legal
Remedies: The Unfounded Adoption of Assurances and
Guarantees of Non-Repetition, 7 UCLA J. Int'l & Foreign Aff.
265 (2002-03). (5, 7).
Examines the introduction by the International Court of Justice
of the mechanism of Assurances and Guarantees of Non-
Repetition (AGNR) as a novel remedy for breach of customary
international legal obligations. Surveys legitimacy theory and
transnational legal process theory and concludes that the use of
AGNRs is neither sufficiently legitimated nor adequately
internalized as an operative norm within the international
community to support the broader process of legalization.
Swaine, Edward T., Rational Custom, 52 Duke L. J. 559 (2002).
(I c/f, 2, 3, 9).
Contends, on the basis of empirical evidence, that the dispute
between legitimacy theory and rational choice theory over the
causal significance of norms to state behaviors can be reconciled
through adoption of a thick theory of rationality. Argues that,
under some circumstances, even rational self-interested states
may determine that complying with customary law may
maximize their welfare because they regard affording respect to
international legal processes or to particular normative
principles as inherently valuable or, even more likely, because
reputation matters. Suggests that maximization of international
cooperation must take into account the possibility that even self-
interested states may actively seek to adhere to customary legal
obligations.
Tallberg, Jonas, Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management,
and the European Union, 56 Int'l Org. 609 (2002). (lb/e, 2, 5, 7,
10).
Assesses the competing claims of enforcement theory, which
hypothesizes that the threat of sanctions induces compliance,
and managerial theory, which contends that the inherent
propensity of states to comply can be maximized through
positive inducements, the provision of technical assistance, and
the establishment of fora to aid negotiation and harmonization of
policies and interests. Examines the practice of the European
Union, a regime that incorporates elements of both enforcement
and management in a "management enforcement ladder," and
concludes that the inclusion of both mechanisms creates the
most effective regime. Compares the E.U. to other international
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legal regimes, including the World Trade Organization, the
European Court of Justice, and the European Court of Human
Rights, to conclude that the E.U. experience, though historically
distinct, is replicable and that regimes in issue-areas such as
trade, environmental protection, and human rights will achieve
greatest effectiveness through a holistic approach to compliance.
Tay, Simon S.C., Southeast Asian Fires: The Challenge for
International Environmental Law and Sustainable Development,
11 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 241 (1999). (le, 2).
Advances the managerialist premise that the primary obstacle to
compliance with environmental law is technical incapacity.
Notes that failures in compliance with environmental regimes
have serious trans-border consequences. Enumerates a myriad
of sources of and explanations for inadequate compliance
support offered by existing international and regional
organizational mechanisms. Suggests that enhanced compliance
with international environmental law will likely require
developed states and even private actors to offer positive
inducements-"carrots"--to states with low technical capacities.
Thompson, Alexander, Applying Rational Choice Theory to
International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls, 31 J. Leg. Stud. 285
(2002). (2, 8, 9).
Accepts the rational choice assumption that legal decisions are
market-like choices but faults rational choice theory for failing
to offer a clear and testable definition of rationality. Concludes
that the influences of reputation are less salient with regard to
states than in regard to individuals. Challenges scholars in the
ILC field to model their theories properly by specifying testable
and falsifiable hypotheses.
Trachtman, Joel P., Bananas, Direct Effect, and Compliance, 10
Eur. J. Int'l L. 655 (1999). (2, 3).
Explains the proliferation of "soft law" agreements and the
indeterminacy of international legal regimes are essential to
attract and preserve powerful states as members by allowing
them to avoid circumstances in which they perceive no
alternative other than patent noncompliance. Rejects the
transnational legal process prediction that obedience is the
ultimate objective of international law and suggests, instead, that
the possibilities for compliance will always be tempered by the
realities of state self-interests.
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Trimble, Phillip R., International Law, World Order, and Critical
Legal Studies, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 811 (1990). (4, 5).
Advocates the centrality of international law to the construction
of the post-Cold War international order. Surveys the critical
legal studies critique of realism. Develops the liberalist premise
that the first step in the diffusion of and compliance with
international legal obligations is the incorporation of
international law in the domestic legal systems of states.
Advances the core premise common to legitimacy theory and
constructivism which holds that the perception by domestic
elites in the judicial and executive branches of government that
international legal obligations are legitimate is necessary to
induce voluntary compliance.
Tyler, Tom R., Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A
Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int'l Pol. 219 (1996-97).
(lh/k, 2, 5, 8, 10).
Surveys empirical studies that support the assertion that legal
rules fail to marshal sufficient deterrent threats to enforce
compliance. Contends that effective legal regimes require
voluntary compliance, which, in turn, requires the promotion of
a "culture of compliance" rooted in normative perceptions of
law, and the institutions that administer law, as moral and
legitimate. Identifies lack of trust in institutions and officials as
a principal obstacle to the enhancement of legal legitimacy and
proposes "moral development strategies" to re-establish trust.
Weiss, Edith Brown, Understanding Compliance with
International Environmental Agreements: The Baker's Dozen
Myths, 32 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1555 (1999). (2, 5, 10).
Describes the concept of compliance in scalar, rather than
dichotomous, terms and contends that whether states adhere to
their international agreements is a matter of degree.
Distinguishes effectiveness from compliance and urges scholars
to focus on the former. Argues that the most effective
agreements may be those that are tolerant of some defection.
Disputes the liberalist premise that democracies and free market
polities are inherently more compliant than non-democratic
states and challenges the conclusion of enforcement theory that
coercion is necessary to support cooperation. Concludes that
regime architects must be prepared to consider a range of
strategies for inducing compliance and tailor each agreement to
its membership.
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Wendt, Alexander, Constructing International Politics, 20 Int'l
Sec. 71 (1995). (1 i, 8).
Hypothesizes that the fundamental structures of international
relations are social rather than material and that these structures
shape the identities and preferences of actors. Contends that the
subjective preferences of individuals, groups, and states can be
constructed by transnational, interactive, and transformative
social processes, cumulatively known as globalization, to favor
cooperation and compliance with the normative content of legal
regimes. Enunciates an important role for human agency in the
social processes of construction of preferences favoring
compliance with law.
Williamson Jr., Richard L., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in
Multilateral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 Chi.
J. Int'l L. 59 (2003). (ib, 2, 6, 7).
Distinguishes 'effectiveness" from "compliance" in the context
of arms control treaties. Identifies a number of factors that
enhance compliance, including inclusion of all relevant states in
treaty membership and maximization of the clarity of legal
obligations. Highlights methodological difficulties in assessing
compliance, including sui generis nature of cases, absence of
available data, and differential capacities of states. Briefly
surveys ILC theories and propounds a series of testable
hypotheses generally favoring "hard law" over "soft law" as
more likely to foster compliance.
Yoshida, 0., Soft Enforcement of Treaties: The Montreal
Protocol's Noncompliance Procedure and the Functions of Internal
International Institutions, 10 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 95
(1999). (le, 2, 6, 10).
Differentiates "hard" enforcement-international adjudication
and sanctions-from "soft" enforcement-reporting,
monitoring, and verification backed by financial incentives to
compliance-in international environmental law. Examines the
application of "soft" enforcement mechanisms in the context of
the ozone regimes. Suggests that the selection of a flexible
definition of "noncompliance," coupled with "soft" enforcement
mechanisms employed by treaty-created institutions governed
democratically and multilaterally by states-parties and free to
employ not only principles of law but also principles of equity in
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evaluating compliance, may well be the ideal approach to
fostering cooperation more generally in the issue-area of
environmental protection.
Young, Oran R., Compliance and Public Authority (1979). (1k, 3,
5,8).
Discounts the causal significance of legal regulation in regard to
the behavior of actors in social relations generally. Treats
individuals, the ultimate subjects of all law and the actors
responsible for compliance decisions, as the relevant focus of
ILC theories. Hypothesizes that a host of individual
psychological variables that tap a series of beliefs, motives, and
images, such as the desire to generate reciprocity, altruism,
reputational concerns, fear of sanctions, social pressures, or
moral obligations, better explain and predict the phenomenon of
compliance decision-making than variables drawn from other
levels of analysis.
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